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Scholars estimating policy positions from political texts typically code words or
sentences and then build left-right policy scales based on the relative frequencies of
text units coded into different categories. Here we reexamine such scales and propose
a theoretically and linguistically superior alternative based on the logarithm of odds-
ratios. We contrast this scale with the current approach of the Comparative Manifesto
Project (CMP), showing that our proposed logit scale avoids widely acknowledged
flaws in previous approaches. We validate the new scale using independent expert
surveys. Using existing CMP data, we show how to estimate more distinct policy
dimensions, for more years, than has been possible before, and make this dataset
publicly available. Finally, we draw some conclusions about the future design of
coding schemes for political texts.lsq_6 123..156
Almost anyone interested in party competition, whether this
takes place in legislatures, the electoral arena, or government, needs
sooner or later to estimate the policy positions of key political actors,
whether these be individual legislators or the political parties to which
they affiliate. Indeed, “how to best measure the policy preferences of
individual legislators and of legislative parties” (Loewenberg 2008,
499) forms one of the central problems of legislative research. This
is particularly true for scholars of comparative legislative research.
While in the American settings policy preferences of legislators have
been conceptualized as individual-level variables, tight party disci-
pline in many non-American contexts makes it difficult to derive
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estimates of legislators’ ideal points that are distinct from aggregate
policy stances of the parties to which they belong. Over the last two
years this journal has devoted particular attention to the problem of
measuring the policy preferences of legislators (e.g., Alemán et al.
2009; Carroll et al. 2009; Carrubba, Gabel, and Hug 2008; Clinton
and Jackman 2009; Hix and Noury 2009; Saiegh 2009; Schickler and
Pearson 2009). Here we contribute to this discussion by focusing on
the estimates of policy positions of parties in legislatures on different
dimensions over time.
In comparative legislative research, there are many sources of
data from which estimates of the policy positions of key political
actors—be these legislators or legislative parties—can be derived.
These include, among others: mass surveys; expert surveys; political
text; roll-call votes; and bill sponsorship (see Benoit and Laver 2006,
for a review). By far the most abundant source of data on policy
positions, both cross-sectionally and over time, is political text. Text is
a direct by-product of political activity by the political actors whose
positions we wish to estimate, whether this text takes the form of
speeches, debates, written submissions, written rulings, or—by far the
most commonly used in the profession for estimating party policy
positions—election manifestos issued by political parties. These mani-
festos outline policies that parties will enact once elected to legislative
or executive office and serve as the empirical basis for many models of
party competition in legislative and other policymaking settings.
The wide availability of these materials in electronic form has led
to a large number of automated and semiautomated methods for scaling
positions from political texts based on the statistical analysis of word
patterns (e.g., Bara, Weale, and Biquelet 2007; Benoit and Laver 2003;
Hilliard, Purpura, and Wilkerson 2007; Hopkins and King 2010; Klem-
mensen, Hobolt, and Hansen 2007; Laver and Garry 2000; Lowe 2008;
Martin and Vanberg 2007; Monroe and Maeda 2004; Pennings and
Keman 2002; Quinn et al. 2010; Slapin and Proksch 2008; Yu, Kauf-
mann, and Diermeier 2008). Despite this growth in automated methods,
however, the most common means of analyzing political text remains
manual content analysis (Krippendorff 2004; Neuendorf 2002). In a
traditional manual content analysis, a predefined categorical coding
scheme is applied to segments of text by trained human coders (e.g.,
Baumgartner, Green-Pedersen, and Jones 2008). The most comprehen-
sive and most frequently used such dataset comes from the Comparative
Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006, hereaf-
ter CMP) which contains the results of coding more than 3,000 election
manifestos for more than 650 parties in over 50 countries. CMP data
124 Will Lowe et al.
form the basis for hundreds of published studies by third-party authors
and are almost always used to estimate policy positions for political
parties on left-right scales.Almost everyone using CMP data does so for
the same reason: they want to estimate positions of parties on different
common policy dimensions. Doing this typically implies assuming that
a set of party positions, whether a cross-section or a time series, can be
located on some (continuously defined) metric scale. Such a scale
allows analysts to make statements to the effect that, for example: party
A is “moving” towards the left; partiesA andB are “closer” to each other
than either is to party C; given parties A, B, and C, the “median
legislator” in the set of three parties is at X; and so on. Spatial theories
of policy preferences typically assume that party positions exist on a
continuous scale, usually an interval scale, although content coding
schemes such as the CMP record only absolute and relative category
counts of discrete text units. To convert these observed category counts
into points on a continuous policy dimension, therefore, some scaling
procedure is required. The CMP data offer several general political
scales based on aggregating counts of text categories. The most widely
used of these is the CMP’s left-right “Rile” scale, constructed by
subtracting the sum of 13 “left”-associated categories from the sum of
13 “right”-oriented categories.1 There are many different ways to con-
struct such scales, however, and the choice of scaling procedure
involves decisions that must be defended on methodological and sub-
stantive grounds.
In this article we present a new method for scaling continuous
left-right policy positions from political text coded into discrete
categories and demonstrate its superiority to current approaches.
Comparing our measure to previous scales, we demonstrate that our
proposed scale not only better satisfies general political, linguistic,
and psychological criteria, but also that it exhibits superior empirical
properties when applied to the CMP data. We validate our new scale
externally through comparison to independent expert surveys. Not
only can our new approach be applied to improve existing policy
estimates for the most commonly used CMP scales, it can also be
used with existing CMP data to unlock reliable positional estimates on
new policy dimensions. These new and improved scales will provide
researchers in legislative studies with not only more valid measures
of the policy positions than ever before, but also unlock measures
for previously unused dimensions of policy that can be used to test
empirical models of party competition, legislative coalitions, govern-
ment formation, and executive-legislative relations. To make the scale
immediately useful to applied researchers, we provide a full dataset,
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described in an appendix and in Tables 1 and 3, of these newly scaled
policy positions with 21 new left-right scales, at least half of which
have never before been used in applied, published research. Following
the method for estimating uncertainty from political text of Benoit,
Laver, and Mikhaylov (2009), we also provide confidence intervals
for every new estimate. Finally, by justifying and demonstrating what
types of coding categories are best compared to create continuous
scales, our findings provide direct lessons for the future design of
improved political text coding schemes.
How Should Policy Mentions Be Counted?
The CMP’s manual coding process involves several stages. In
the first step, a human coder is given a political party manifesto, which
he or she then divides into discrete, nonoverlapping text units known
as “quasi-sentences.” Quasi-sentences are textual units that express a
policy proposition and may be either a complete natural sentence or
part of one. Once identified, the quasi-sentence is then assigned to one
of 56 mutually exclusive policy categories, distributed across seven
broad policy domains such as “Political System” or “Economy.” CMP
data thus take the form of counts of sentences in categories, a unit of
analysis that is intermediate between the more holistic analysis offered
by an interpretative approach and more detailed syntactic analyses
(Popping 2007; van Atteveldt, Kleinnijenhuis, and Ruigrok 2008) and
purely lexical approaches (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003; Slapin and
Proksch 2008). Category counts are then converted to percentages by
dividing by the total number of sentences in the manifesto. These
category percentages are then either interpreted directly as conveying
information about the policy preferences of their authors or may be
additively scaled to construct more general indices.
Normalizing counts this way makes sense under three conditions
that we will not, for the purposes of this article, dispute: first, the
sentence is the fundamental unit of policy assertion; second, different
sentences assigned to the same category are exchangeable or indepen-
dently distributed conditional on their policy category; third, the total
number of sentences assigned to any policy category contains no
information about the policy preferences that a platform expresses.
The precise choice of how to construct a left-right scale from the
normalized sentence counts, however, requires decisions to be made in
the construction of scales. Scaling category counts, that is, choosing a
procedure to transform observed category counts into estimates of
unobserved policy positions, means addressing two independent
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questions about the content and the form of a scale. These are two
fundamental questions to which we will return as we evaluate different
methods of scaling left and right policy.
First, how should sentences be counted when constructing a scale
for a particular policy domain? Should one category be considered
against an absolute standard, or relative to the counts in a different
category, or perhaps relative to the entire document? Second, what is
the functional form of the relationship between position and counts?
In particular, what is the nature of the marginal effect on sentence
counts of changes in a party’s position in the policy domain linked to
the sentence counts? While these two key issues frame a debate that
has previously occupied methodologists concerned specifically with
scaling policy positions from the CMP data (e.g., Kim and Fording
2002; McDonald and Mendes 2001a), the debate applies much more
generally to any effort to construct continuous scales from text coded
into discrete categories. In what follows, we reexamine both issues
from both a substantive political standpoint and also from linguistic
and psychological perspectives.
Previous Approaches to Scaling Policy Measures
In the discussion of scaling measures we assume that for each
policy dimension there exists a “left” and a “right” direction repre-
sented by at least one CMP category.2 We will denote the number of
sentences in a manifesto assigned to the “left” and “right” categories
constituting a policy issue as L and R, respectively, and the total
number of sentences in all categories as N. (There is also an “other”
category count O to completely partition the sentences, such that
L + R + O = N.) For instance, for a policy dimension of more to less
protectionism, L would be the number of sentences coded to “406
Protectionism: Positive,” while R would be the number of sentences
coded to “407 Protectionism: Negative,” and the corresponding “PER”
variables defined as
L
N
100% and
R
N
100%, respectively. The output
of any scaling procedure is an estimate of the position which we will
refer to as q, superscripting to indicate the scaling procedure and
subscripting as necessary to indicate the policy dimension.
Previous Scaling Procedures
The CMP was designed to reflect “saliency theory,” a particular
view of how parties compete and therefore how they express their
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policy preferences, asserting that “all party programmes endorse the
same position, with only minor exceptions” (Budge et al. 2001, 82).
Parties are assumed to differentiate themselves by emphasising issues
on which they have the best reputation with voters (Budge 1994).
Because positioning is a matter of emphasis, the answer to the first
general methodological question posed above must be that the fre-
quency of quasi-sentences in one policy category should be compared
to all other sentences in the manifesto. Budge (1999) suggests that
a party’s position according to saliency theory, q(S ), should be defined as
θ S R L
N
( )
=
−
.
This saliency measure is based on the difference in counts between left
and right sentences counts normalized by the total number of sen-
tences in the manifesto on any issue or on none.3 From this definition
it is clear that the answer to the second general question posed above
is that each count in L or R has the same marginal effect: 1/N. The
quantity q (S ) is equal to zero when there are exactly the same number
of left- as right-coded sentences, -1 when there is only one issue on
which the party is perfectly “left,” and 1 when there is one issue and
the party is perfectly “right.” In practice, however, the extreme values
are never reached because party competition almost never occurs on
one dimension only. For instance, the distribution of the CMP’s “Rile”
left-right index, a measure that encompasses 26 different coding cat-
egories, has an empirical range of about [-.5, .5].
There is a more subtle constraint on q (S ) hidden in this formula-
tion. All theories accept that if an issue becomes less important then
a party will devote fewer sentences to it. That is, the relative counts
R + L assigned to the contrasting policy pairs R and L, for a specific
policy subset of all policy dimensions in a manifesto, will shrink.
But because R + L is also by definition the maximum range of R - L,
then deemphasizing an issue will push q (S ) to a more centrist position
by moving it closer to 0, even though the proportion of left and right
sentences, the raw material for expressing a position, have not
changed. For the composite “Rile” scale, this means that counts of the
30 categories not in the scale still affect estimated party positions. For
instance, a 200-sentence manifesto with 100 right sentences and no
left sentences would have a Rile score of (50 - 0) = 50, but the same
manifesto with 50 sentences added that are neither left nor right would
change its Rile score to 40 (Benoit and Laver 2007; McDonald and
Mendes 2001b; Ray 2007)—suggesting that the party shifted 20%
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toward the left. In the CMP, this approach is carried to an extreme by
including even uncodeable content in the definition of a manifesto.4
Primarily in order to address this problem, Kim and Fording
(2002) propose an alternative measure that restricts the difference to
sentences from the constituent left and right categories (see also Laver
and Garry 2000). This relative proportional difference estimate of
position is
θ R R L
R L
( )
=
−
+
.
The measure also ranges from -1 to 1, but makes explicit the range
constraint hidden in q (S ). Dividing by R + L decouples the measure
from variation in the importance a party assigns to any issue area.
The only remaining influence of variable issue importance is
that the overall number of sentences available to express a position is
increased or reduced. To take an extreme case, only three positions are
expressible within a budget of two sentences: either both are left, both
right, or one is assigned to each category, leading to estimated posi-
tions of -1/2, 0, or 1/2. Coarse sampling does not necessarily imply
anything about the party’s actual position on the issue but rather limits
the level of nuance and specificity that it can be expressed in a mani-
festo and the precision that may be inferred from it by readers and
researchers. According to spatial theory assumptions the party has a
position on the issue dimensions, but has chosen to use its supply of
sentences on other dimensions. Finally, unlike q (S ) this measure will
not necessarily create an apparent move to a more centrist position if
the party decides to focus on other policy areas.
In terms of the two methodological questions above, q (R)
compares category counts only to counts in the opposing category
rather than to counts of all quasi-sentences. The marginal effect of
another sentence on the left or right side of the issue is therefore
1/(R + L).
Although q (R) appears to fix the problem of sentences in unre-
lated or uncoded categories affecting position estimates, it shares the
assumptions embodied in q (S ) about the fixed marginal effect of
another coded sentence and the existence of fixed endpoints. This has
the unfortunate effect of forcing the q (R) to -1 when R = 0 irrespective
of the value of L, or to 1 when L = 0 irrespective of the value of R,
leading to spikes at the boundaries of the scale. That the scale has
boundaries at all is a basic problem with both procedures that attempt
to measure policy positions that are more naturally conceptualized in
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an underlying continuum. The essential insight behind q (R) is surely
correct—the position of a party on a policy dimension should depend
only on L and R. The problem is that the nature of the quantity being
estimated is not respected in the measure. A different answer to the
second general question is needed.
A Scaling Method Based on Log Odds-Ratios
To motivate a new scaling method, consider the process of
reading a party manifesto for changes in policy content, as a voter
might do, for example, if trying to identify any change in some party’s
policy position on the European Union. If the party’s previous plat-
form contained 50 sentences in favour of increased European integra-
tion, and 20 emphasizing its disadvantages, then a new manifesto
containing 50 sentences in favor and 21 against would barely register
as an indicator of policy change. But if the previous platform had
contained 10 and 4 sentences for and against the EU, and the new
platform 10 and 5, then a policy change is more plausible. This
suggests that the balance between assertions in favour of the EU and
against it between platforms is usefully summarized not by the differ-
ence between sentence counts, but rather by their ratio. The effect of
adding one more sentence in the first case decreases the ratio of pro-
to anti-EU sentences by about 5%, and in the second by 20%. By this
reasoning, the marginal effect of one more sentence is decreasing in
the amount that has already been said on the topic. Proportional or
relative emphasis on different topics does indeed determine a reader’s
estimate of position, but such changes must be perceivable against the
background of existing policy emphasis.
This simple linguistic intuition about reading and writing mani-
festos can be supported by evidence from psychology. The decreasing
marginal effect of an extra unit is a general property of many percep-
tual quantities such as temperature, heat, or loudness studied by psy-
chophysicists.5 The Weber-Fechner law (Fechner 1965; Stevens 1957)
formalises this observation: the size of the “just perceivable differ-
ence” of a subjective quantity is a constant proportion of the quantity
already present.6 Consequently we should operate in proportions, not
levels, and work with a logarithmic scale relationship between the
underlying quantity and subjective estimations of it. For loudness, this
relationship is the familiar decibel scale, which relates perceived loud-
ness as the log of the physical power of the sound.7 Following this
logic it should also be possible to consider the “just perceivable policy
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difference,” the proportional change necessary to infer a difference in
position on an issue between two party platforms.
The Logit Scale of Position
Our logic suggests that from the point of view of a party mani-
festo writer wanting to communicate a position effectively, it is impor-
tant to manipulate not so much the absolute quantity of sentences
allocated (R + L), but rather their relative balance, or R/L. Increasing
R + L allows a wider range of expressible policy positions, but
manipulating R/L expresses the position itself. Furthermore, because
we are primarily interested in inferring positions, we view it as most
natural to consider proportional changes on a symmetrical left-right
scale. One natural measure for this purpose is the empirical logit:
θ L R
L
( )
=
+
+
log
.
.
5
5
(1)
= +( ) − +( ) 5 5log . log . .R L (2)
Like q (R), q (L) is conditional because it only considers sentences that are
assigned to left or right. Unlike q (S ) and q (R), however, the logit scale q (L)
has no predefined end points: given enough sentences, it is possible
to generate positions of any level of extremity.8 In this respect, q (L)
better reflects spatial politics assumptions about the possible range of
ideal points. However, although any real valued policy position can be
represented, expressing extreme positions requires exponentially more
sentences in L or R to move the policy position the same distance left or
right as can be seen by considering its alternative formulation (2) as a
difference measure.9
We should note that although q (L) is defined as a (logged) ratio, it
offers interval not ratio level measurement. In particular, q (L) = 0
should not automatically be identified as a substantively centrist policy
position. In the absence of an external anchor, e.g., to policy outcomes,
a centrist position would be some function of the mean or median
position on an issue of the parties contesting the election. How this
position will be expressed in R, L terms will depend on historically
contingent country-level factors.10
Using the logit function to transform count data represents a
novel approach to scaling left-right policy positions, but logit trans-
formations are found in many inferential models used to estimate
latent party positions. Log odds-ratios form the basis of the most
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commonly used statistical models of bounded count data (Agresti
1996; Fleiss, Levin, and Paik 2003), item response and unfolding (Elff
2008), and have been studied directly by Monroe, Quinn, and Colaresi
(2008).11 Nevertheless, q (L) is explicitly not itself a model of the
structure of policy positions but rather a way to measure them that is
compatible with several theories of spatial politics. We do not pursue
such models here because we are unwilling either to introduce the
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) constraint on policy
dimensions that would be imposed by logit models or to estimate
explicitly the distribution of party positions on multiple dimensions as
required by probit models. Consequently we also take no position on
important substantive issues such as the underlying dimensionality
of the policy space and the correlational structure connecting issue
dimensions (Elff 2008; Gabel and Huber 2000) or the dynamics of
party positions over time. Our more modest goal here is to improve the
future use of the hugely popular CMP dataset, after demonstrating a
better way to scale policy positions than the CMP’s existing, flawed
approach. Furthermore, our confrontational pairing method provides
scales for more policy dimensions than ever before used from the
CMP dataset. Whether these new positions are comparable over time,
or accurately reflect the underlying dimensions of politics, are separate
questions that are broader than we can feasibly address here.
Instead, we focus on the scaling procedure that connects basic
data of the CMP—counts of sentences in categories—to the policy
positions that form the substantive quantities of interest. Even without
making model assumptions, we can show that q (L) is a far better
predictor of party policy positions than previous measures.We do
make one concession towards model structure by adding 0.5 to all
counts, a standard statistical practice for the analysis of contingency
tables (Agresti 1996) that can also be motivated as a measure to reduce
bias when estimating category proportions (Brown, Cai, and Das-
Gupta 2001; Firth 1993). This smooths q (L) slightly towards 0 and
makes position estimates created from very small counts more stable,
while barely affecting those derived from more reasonable numbers of
sentences.
A Log Scale of Policy Importance
In addition to having different positions on each of a given set
of policy dimensions, political actors may also differ in terms of the
relative importance they attach to these dimensions. As Laver and
Hunt (1992) demonstrated, some issues are simply more important to
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some parties than to others, quite independent of their party positions
on these dimensions, a distinction long-recognized by other scholars
(e.g., Grofman 2004; Riker 1996). We thus expect “green” parties to
treat the environmental dimension as the most important policy
domain, and indeed this is part of our implicit definition of the set of
green parties. Likewise, we expect far-right parties to treat immigra-
tion and social values as the most important dimensions. Both liberal
and far-right parties might consider social values to be very important,
yet take very different positions on this dimension. Scholars con-
cerned with the policies of political actors are typically concerned
with both position and importance. Empirical methods often draw
this distinction very explicitly, as with the expert surveys of Laver and
Hunt (1992), Benoit and Laver (2006), and Hooghe et al. (2008).
Notwithstanding this very clear analytical distinction between
the importance, or salience, of a policy dimension and party positions
on that dimension, the widely used policy scales (as opposed to raw
data) generated by the CMP are fundamentally grounded in the
CMP’s “saliency theory” of party competition (MPP, 76). This explic-
itly conflates party positions on policy dimensions and the relative
salience of these dimensions. The core idea of saliency theory is that,
in a given setting, parties will endorse only single sides of each issue,
such as reducing crime, providing for the national defense, or protect-
ing the environment. Parties differentiate themselves by emphasizing
the issues on which their stances are most credible (MPP, 7). Conse-
quently, the “taking up of positions is done through emphasizing the
importance of certain policy areas compared to others” (Budge 1994,
455).12 Operationally, “saliency” theory suggests that the relative
mention of different policy areas in manifestos provides a direct
measure of their importance to the party. Despite this prediction that
issues are overwhelmingly one-sided, however, the CMP’s coding
scheme makes numerous practical concessions to the fact that many
issues are clearly two-sided, such as positions on free trade, on the
level of government regulation, or on attitudes toward European inte-
gration. The existence of paired categories in the CMP scheme cov-
ering opposite sides of the same issue complicates the straightforward
assessment of policy salience based on counting relative mentions of
a single policy category. Our solution is simple: to group mentions of
an issue, whether positive or negative, and to consider their sum as
a direct indicator of policy importance. Our scale also follows the
psychological and linguistic rationale for logarithmic emphasis as
explained previously, however.
Our suggested measure of policy importance is
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θ I R L
N
( )
=
+ +
log ,
1
with a value of 1.0 added to the numerator for consistency with the 0.5
for R and L in the position formulation. This measure follows directly
from the relative emphasis logic of saliency theory and also conforms
to the linguistic model we have already outlined by increasing
logarithmically in extremity with additional mentions.
Estimating Scale Uncertainty
It has become widely accepted that text-based measures of policy
quantities should come with associated estimates of uncertainty, rather
than simply being presented as if they contained no stochastic element
or measurement error (see Benoit, Laver, and Mikhaylov 2009). For
this reason we also provide a means of computing standard errors and
confidence intervals associated with our new scales of position and
importance.
If a parametric measure of uncertainty is required, we suggest a
simple Bayesian approach: a standard Beta prior over the proportions
of L and R sentences with parameters aR = aL = a implies a posterior
distribution over position that is well approximated as
θ μ σL R L( ) ( ), ,∼ Normal 2
μ  = +( )
+( )log
R a
L a
σ 2 1 1  = +( ) + +( )− −R a L a
when R + L  10. Setting a = 0.5 corresponds to a symmetrical invari-
ant Jeffreys prior over party position (Jeffreys 1946). This distribution
above suggests the 95% credible interval
θ σ θ σL L( ) ( )− +[ ]1 96 1 96. , .
which corresponds closely to the classical confidence intervals (when
they are defined) while being numerically more stable (Newcombe
2001).
Many counts of quasi-sentences representing R or L, however,
may be zero or close to zero in observed data, implying nonsymmetric
bounds that will affect the parametric computation of confidence inter-
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vals. An alternative to the parametric estimation that we propose is to
use bootstrapping methods (Efron and Tibshirani 1994) to provide
nonparametric intervals by resampling R and L categories in each
policy dimension. In the dataset provided with this article and in the
analyses presented here, we compute nonparametric confidence inter-
vals and standard errors for all position and importance scales repre-
sented in the article, using the approach outlined by Benoit, Laver, and
Mikhaylov (2009).
New Policy Scales
We have constructed a set of 13 policy scales from the CMP
dataset, each representing a distinct dimension of policy on which
parties may take positions. These are detailed in Table 1. For each
scale, we have identified a pair of CMP categories expressing policy
opposites and classified the elements of each pair as either Right or
Left. The pairings in Table 1 are natural and probably closer to what
was originally intended by the designers of the CMP’s coding
scheme, although most are seldom or never used in this way. This
alternative to the saliency approach has often been termed the “con-
frontational” approach to policy (Budge et al. 2001; Gemenis and
Dinas 2010) and involves parties declaring competing positions on
the same issue. In this view of policy, what matters is not whether
each party purports to emphasize the issue or downplay it, but rather
what the party’s specific policy stances are relative to the extreme
positions on any given issue, for instance what degree of permissive-
ness or restrictiveness regulation it favors regarding the issues of
euthanasia, homosexual marriage, and abortion (Laver 2001, 66) or
whether a party favours expanding the power of European-level insti-
tutions or instead reinforcing national sovereignty. Our logit scale
extends and generalizes this logic while applying the notion of rela-
tive difference that also scales policy extremity in a way that relates
to repetition in a nonlinear fashion.
In addition to these natural opposites, there are many categories
for which natural policy alternatives could have been identified when
the CMP coding scheme was being designed, but which do not in fact
exist in the coding scheme. We identify these categories in Table 2.
With the sole exception of 408 Economic Goals, these categories all
relate to matters of public policy that are inherently positional.
The rationale for the CMP’s unwillingness to define polar oppo-
sites for these coding categories appears to be that one position seems
likely to be almost universally unpopular. Consider corruption or the
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environment: Since no party is likely to support corruption or call for
trashing the ecosystem, “saliency” theory assumptions seem plausible
for such policy issues. A closer look, however, reveals a more nuanced
picture. On environmental policy, for instance, parties do not always
produce purely one-sided statements. Many parties do in fact take
progrowth stances that contain thinly veiled antienvironmental mes-
sages. For instance, the 1988 Danish Liberal Party manifesto contains
this statement: “Environmental policy should not result in Danish
companies being worse off than the companies in the countries
with which we compete.”13 The Danish Liberal Party is clearly not
proenvironment, preferring instead to let the natural environment
suffer in exchange for the economic benefits that presumably come
from easing environmental regulations on firms. This direct preference
for industry over the environment is in fact how other schemes for
measuring environmental policy have expressed the environmental
policy dimension: as contrasting priorities for environmental protec-
tion (at the cost of economic growth) versus economic growth (at the
cost of environmental damage; Benoit and Laver 2006; Laver and
Hunt 1992). We believe that this logic of contrasting extremes applies
quite generally.
Not every quantity of end-user interest from the CMP may exist
in the form of text units assigned to one of two bipolar categories.
TABLE 2
CMP Scales with No Natural Policy Opposites
Policy Issue CMP Category
Imperialism 103 Anti-Imperialism: Anti-Colonialism
Peace 106 Peace: Positive
Freedom/Human Rights 201 Freedom and Human Rights: Positive
Democracy 202 Democracy: Positive
Efficiency 303 Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: Positive
Corruption 304 Political Corruption: Negative
Political Authority 305 Political Authority: Positive
(General) Economic Goals 408 Economic Goals
Corporatism 405 Corporatism: Positive
Technology and Infrastructure 411 Technology and Infrastructure: Positive
Cultural Policy 502 Culture: Positive
Social Justice 503 Social Justice: Positive
Law and Order 605 Law and Order: Positive
Social Harmony 606 Social Harmony: Positive
Agricultural Policy 703 Farmers: Positive
Middle Class Policy 704 Middle Class and Professional Groups: Positive
Affirmative Action 705 Underprivileged Minority Groups: Positive
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Indeed, most users are only interested in the CMP dataset for its
aggregate left-right scale. Fortunately, our measure works equally well
for aggregated categories of R and L when each R and L consists of
more than one component category count. Furthermore, as with the
“Rile” index that includes quantities such as “305 Political Authority:
Positive” that have no opposite category in the CMP coding scheme,
many of these measures may denote right-measured positions yet not
be usable in any simple, bipolar scale. For multicategory indexes, q (L)
is defined the same way after aggregating category counts into a
composite L and R:
θ indexL
jj
kk
R
L
( )
=
∑
∑log .
As with simple scales involving only two categories, the zero point on
this scale is not substantively privileged and should not necessarily be
identified with a centrist policy position. This is particularly clear
when different numbers of categories are used in the numerator and
denominator.
In Table 3 we have listed a set of proposed additive indexes that
are amenable to use with the logit scale, wherever possible identifying
the source where this index was developed. We have also proposed
several new scales of our own, such as “Free Market Economy” and
“State-provided Services.” Our proposed scale of environmental pro-
tection follows the confrontational pairing logic by treating the two
proenvironmental categories “Antigrowth Economy: Positive” (416)
and of course “Environmental Protection: Positive” (501) together to
capture antigrowth politics, ecologism as “left,” and the environmen-
tally opposed paradigm of economic growth is represented in the CMP
by the category “Productivity: Positive” (410).14 In the next section we
compare our scale to previous formulations and also compare the scale
estimates to independent measures of position and importance from
expert surveys.
Validating the Logit Policy Scale
Comparing Scales
Before turning to validation against experts it is helpful to
compare the properties of q (S ), q (R), and q (L) as measurements. The
problems we have identified with both q (S ) and q (R) are fairly easy to
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illustrate by comparing them for a range of values across almost any
scale. Notably, q (R) has a problem of reaching its limits for the
extremes when L > 0, R = 0 or R > 0, L = 0. While the problem with
q (S ) is that it registers linear changes with each additional extreme-
coded text unit in such situations, q (R) registers no changes at all.
Hence, a manifesto registering five exclusively left text units would be
the same as one registering 500. To demonstrate this using the CMP
data, Figure 1 plots the relative proportional difference versus the
“saliency” scalings of the confrontational pair for “National Way of
Life: Positive/Negative” (categories 601 and 602). The vertically
stacked points at the limits of the scale (at -1.0 and 1.0) show that
additional mentions cause linear increases for the saliency scale, but
no change for the relative proportional difference measure.
Several other problems with the existing scales also emerge
from an inspection of Figure 1. First, because mentions of “national
way of life” are relatively low in absolute frequency across manifes-
tos, and because (R - L)/N  (R + L)/N, the low frequency of these
statements relative to all other statements severely shrinks q (S )
toward zero. The saliency measure is insensitive to changes for
policy dimensions with low absolute frequency and misleadingly
assigns a difference score close to the zero point. While we have
shown this here for only the national way of life categories 601 and
602, it also applies to the CMP’s biggest scale, Rile, encompassing
FIGURE 1
Comparing the Relative Proportional Difference to the Saliency
Scale for “National Way of Life” (categories 601 and 602)
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26 categories in all. While in theory this scale runs from -1.0 to 1.0
(as a proportion), in practice the range spans only from -.5 to .5 for
almost every manifesto measured.
A second problem, again with q (S ) can be seen at the extremes
defined as L > 0, R = 0 for a left extreme, or R > 0, L = 0 for a
right extreme. Extremity on the saliency measure q (S ) increases at a
linear rate with each additional text unit in the extreme category.
Substantively, the suggestion is that the same change occurs when the
extreme-only category text units increase from 5 to 10 units, as when
it increases from 105 to 100 units. This assumption of linear change
in position given observed text unit counts is neither sensible nor
supported by perceptual theory (see our discussion of the Weber-
Fechner law above).
For each of these problems we have identified in q (S ), a corre-
sponding problem can also be found in q (R). The middle-range problem
of lack of sensitivity for q (S ) is exactly reversed in q (R): small differ-
ences between R and L become highly influential on q (R) when these
are scaled as ratios of relative content R + L. An extreme example
makes the point: imagine a series of manifestos from a party that
had no real interest whatsoever in, and effectively no position on,
protectionism. Irrelevant stochastic factors in text generation, or in the
coding of the text, could plausibly result in a few essentially random
counts of text units into each of the protectionism categories. The
effect on q (R) will be drastic in this situation, massively leveraging
the error because it is only concerned with relatively proportional
content.
If we compare the overall distribution of data for one of our
composite scales—the environmental policy scale described above—
we can see a fairly stark contrast between the spread of values
for different scales that reinforces the patterns we observed in exam-
ining the National Way of Life scale. In Figure 2, we compare the
distribution of scores for “PER501 Environmental Protection: Posi-
tive” to a “confrontational” scale constructed from opposing catego-
ries. Our new scale of environmental protection is based on adding
the two proenvironmental categories “Antigrowth Economy: Posi-
tive” (PER416) and “Environmental Protection: Positive” (PER501)
as capturing antigrowth politics and “ecologism” and contrasting this
with the environmentally opposed paradigm of economic growth,
represented in the CMP by the category “Productivity: Positive”
(PER410). Figure 2 not only shows the better dispersion of the logit
scale, but also demonstrates anew the problems we have already
seen: bunching around zero of the saliency scale, as well as the
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FIGURE 2
Distributions of Scales for Proposed Environmental Scales
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bunching around the extremes of the relative proportional difference
scale.
Comparisons to Expert Surveys of Policy
Up to this point we have only compared one scale with another.
To judge more conclusively whether a particular scale measures what
we hope it measures, we can compare the CMP-based scales to inde-
pendent, external measures of party positions based on expert surveys.
Expert surveys such as Benoit and Laver (2006) have been shown to
provide valid and reliable measures of party policy positions, but
existing measures are limited in their time frame to the two decades
since 1990. Only text-based measures such as the CMP have the
potential to provide valid estimates of policy positions going further
back in time. Limited comparisons of expert survey estimates to CMP
measures were conducted by Benoit and Laver (2007), who tested
the saliency-based Rile measures against expert survey ratings of
left-right from Benoit and Laver (2006) and found a high correlation
and lack of bias between the two measures. Because the large number
of categories tends to wash out differences in large additive indexes
such as Rile, here we perform the same comparison using smaller,
more policy-specific scales.
We have compared the CMP-based indexes to the Benoit and
Laver (2006) expert survey estimates of party position on the issue of
social liberalism, one of two fundamental axes of political competition
(the other being economic left-right) on which they place parties in
every country. Some variant of this noneconomic dimension has been
identified as a distinct, basic axis of political competition in numerous
studies (e.g., Inglehart 1984; Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002). Figure 3
plots the Benoit and Laver social liberalism dimension scores against
each of the three scales based on counts of “604/603 Traditional
Morality: Negative/Positive.”
The patterns from the plots are consistent with the interscale
comparisons examined earlier. The saliency scale is highly bunched
around zero, suppressing variation even when huge differences are
identified by the Benoit and Laver scores. The relative proportional
scale in the middle panel shows spotty variation in the middle
ranges, with a very high proportion of values at the right side where
Benoit and Laver indicate a complete range of differences but the
relative proportional scale has reached its maximum value. Finally,
the logit scale looks approximately linear, has no bunching at the
extremes, or dispersed points in the middle. Its scale is centred to
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FIGURE 3
Comparison of CMP Scales of Traditional Morality with Benoit and
Laver (2006) Social Liberalism Dimension
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the right of zero, reflecting the higher proportion of text units of
“Traditional Morality: Positive” (and many exclusively so), but
this does not perturb the scale’s linear relationship with the expert
survey scores. Residual analysis suggests that the relationship
between expert survey scores and q (L) are both linear and
homoskedastic.15
Finally, we perform the comparison with one of our simple
additive scales that is not strictly constructed from a bipolar pair.
This is the dimension of environmental protection, where the “left”
side has two components. This is also an interesting category for
comparison since, as previously discussed, the CMP’s saliency
approach identifies only one possible side to this issue. In Figure 4
we compare the CMP’s default single-category scale of 501, to the
relative absolute proportional difference scale constructed as per
Table 3, and to the corresponding logit scale. The two versions of the
saliency scale (per501 and the difference scale we have proposed)
are not particularly poor, although 501 is clearly bounded to be posi-
tive, with several values where the zero boundary suggests antienvi-
ronmental policies when in fact the party said nothing at all about
the environment. The saliency difference scale (middle plot) is left-
skewed with some extreme proenvironmental values skewing the
pattern. The new scale (bottom plot), however, shows a much better
behaved linear relationship with the Benoit and Laver scores,
without the skew from the saliency or relative proportional differ-
ence plots. The logit scale suggests the more sensible conclusion that
a manifesto containing 40% proenvironmental sentences is not 10
times more proenvironment than a manifesto with just 5%, but rather
only about 2.3 times more. And by comparison to the one-sided
policy issue approach suggested by pure saliency theory, the com-
parison in Figure 4 also reinforces our earlier argument that even
seemingly one-sided issues perform better when recast in terms of
confrontationally opposite categories.
As a final form of external validation, we also compare our
suggested importance scale to the separately measured policy impor-
tance estimates from Benoit and Laver (2006). These are plotted, for
four directly comparable measures, in Figure 5. The positive linear
relationship for these scales suggests that the proposed measure of
importance based on total mentions on either side of an issue do
indeed form a valid indicator of the political importance of this issue
to a party. Our proposed importance measure provides a scale for
importance that is more valid linguistically, based on logarithmically
increasing extremity. It also unlocks a general measure of importance
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FIGURE 4
Comparison of CMP Scale of Environment with Benoit and Laver
(2006) Environmental Dimension
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from the CMP data that has never before been made systematically
available.
Recommendations
By focusing attention on producing better measures of party
policy positions over time, as well as introducing new measures of
party policy, our study should contribute to new developments in the
field of legislative studies, especially the study of legislatures in mul-
tiparty settings. To “understand what a legislature does (and why it
FIGURE 5
Comparison of Proposed Log Importance Scale
with Benoit and Laver (2006) Importance Measures
(only for cases where total R and L mentions are non-zero)
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does it) we need to know the policy preferences of its members”
(Loewenberg 2009, 415). This need for data becomes all the more
interesting at the party level in contexts with multiparty governments,
coalitions, and high party discipline.
Our conclusions can be summarized as follows. First, our
analysis of the use of the logit scale to estimate left-right positions
from counts of textual categories, as well as our demonstration
through direct comparison to other scales as well as to independent
external data, suggests that the logit scale is superior and should
be used in place of the “saliency” and “relative proportional
difference” approaches used previously. We recommend using the
logit scale for all policy categories and have provided a set of
21 such scales (in Tables 1 and 3) that can be constructed directly
from the existing CMP dataset. In addition, we have calculated
uncertainty estimates for all quantities using the simulation method
proposed by Benoit, Laver, and Mikhaylov (2009). This dataset is
available immediately and offers a superior alternative to the esti-
mates supplied by the CMP, estimates that we have shown are based
on the inferior saliency-based scales, and with few exceptions not
constructed in the confrontational pairing approach we recommend
here.
Second, we have proposed a new and separate measure of policy
importance that is consistent with our logit scale of position and
demonstrated that this proposed scale correlates well with indepen-
dent, external measures of policy importance from expert surveys.
These importance estimates are also provided with accompanying
uncertainty measures.
Finally, we have shown that the assumption that individual
parties take only one side, and indeed that all parties take the same
side, of an issue, is demonstrably false, even given the CMP’s own
dataset. For our purposes, this implies a critique of the basic CMP
coding scheme, since the existing scheme consists of a mixture of
confrontational and saliency-based categories. Our analysis suggests
that any revision of the coding scheme would complete the step toward
a fully confrontational coding scheme, consisting only of opposing,
pro and contra categories. It would also be possible to go one step
further and include a neutral category for each confrontational policy
scale, which could be ignored when computing q (L) but counted when
considering q (I ). This would address the concerns of McDonald and
Mendes (2001b) about the nonreflection of neutral stances in the
positional scales, as well as better reflecting overall policy importance
based on counting text units.
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APPENDIX: DATASET DESCRIPTION
The data described in this paper are available for download from
http://www.kenbenoit.net/cmp/scales/. The dataset contains all of the
variables described in Tables 1 and 3, with suffixes indicating whether
the variable refers to position, the 95% confidence interval on position,
the estimate of importance, and the standard errors of position and
importance. For the variable protectionism (for example), the five
associated variables are:
protectionism position estimate
protectionism_lo95 95% lower bound for position estimate
protectionism_hi95 95% upper bound for position estimate
protectionism_SE standard error for position estimate
protectionism_imp importance estimate
protectionism_impSE standard error for importance estimate
NOTES
This paper was originally prepared for presentation at the 2008 ECPR General
Conference, Potsdam. We thank Thomas Däubler and Jonathan Slapin for comments
on multiple drafts of this manuscript. This research was supported in part by the Irish
Research Council for Humanities and the Social Sciences.
1. Details may be found in Table 3. We return to this scale later in the
text.
2. For the initial development we treat each policy area as defined by one “left”
and one “right” CMP category. In fact neutral categories are also possible, and in some
cases it is helpful to aggregate more than one CMP category to generate a substan-
tively appropriate left of right count.
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3. More precisely, the CMP’s saliency-based scale multiplies q by 100 to
allow interpretation as a percentage.
4. The percentage of uncodeable content in the average manifesto in the CMP
combined dataset is 6.8%, making the inclusion of uncoded content a real worry for
many texts.
5. More complex nonlinear marginal effects that decrease the effect of early as
well as later mentions have long been suggested (e.g., Jakobovits and Lambert 1963;
Jakobovits and Hogenraad 1967) and are intuitively reasonable for manifesto data,
perhaps as part of an interaction with issue salience. Investigating this relationship is
further work.
6. Later research (Stevens 1957) has established a range of power law rela-
tionships between physical and subjective magnitudes in different modalities, not all
of which exhibit decreasing marginal effects. Nevertheless we work here with the
logarithmic relationship because of its simplicity, its linguistic motivation as sketched
above, and most importantly, its excellent fit to policy positions generated indepen-
dently by experts, considered below.
7. The scale is given units by reference to a barely perceptible reference
sound.
8. In practice, however, the logit scales applied to the CMP data ranges from
approximately -7 to +7, since few R or L categories (or indeed, N) tend to exceed
log(1000) = 6.9.
9. In applications we follow standard statistical practice in the analysis of
contingency tables and add 0.5 to L and R, (Agresti 1996). This can be motivated as
a means to reduce estimation bias (Firth 1993) or to provide better behaved interval
measures of uncertainty (Brown, Cai, and DasGupta 2001).
10. Statistical latent variable modelers (e.g., Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers
2004; Slapin and Proksch 2008) make the same observation by noting that the zero
point, direction, and units of the measurements are model identification constraints not
substantive assertions about position.
11. In the framework of parametric models, q (L) could be seen as subpart of
a multinomial logistic regression model of the category counts [R, L, N - (R + L)]
in party platform, where N - (R + L) is the number of sentences assigned to other
categories or left uncoded. Using L as a base category, q (L) will, as N increases,
approximate the first linear predictor in such a model.
12. In the saliency theory approach, policy dimensions are assumed to consist
of issue areas or clusters of issues (Robertson 1976, 61).
13. In Danish: “Miljøpolitikken [environmental policy] måikke stille danske
virksomheder dårligere, end virksomhederne i de lande vi konkurrerer med” (Venstre
Manifesto 1988). We thank Jacob Rathlev for this suggestion and Martin Hansen for
drawing attention to this example and for help with the translation.
14. This reflects the definition of one of the core four dimensions in the expert
survey in Benoit and Laver (2006, 129).
15. Similar patterns are easily observed for numerous other scales, such as
Multiculturalism: Positive/Negative against the Benoit and Laver scores for national-
ism and immigration.
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